Abstract. Attacks on classical cryptographic protocols are usually modeled by allowing an adversary to ask queries from an oracle. Security is then defined by requiring that as long as the queries satisfy some constraint, there is some problem the adversary cannot solve, such as compute a certain piece of information. In this paper, we introduce a fundamentally new model of quantum attacks on classical cryptographic protocols, where the adversary is allowed to ask several classical queries in quantum superposition. This is a strictly stronger attack than the standard one, and we consider the security of several primitives in this model. We show that a secret-sharing scheme that is secure with threshold t in the standard model is secure against superposition attacks if and only if the threshold is lowered to t/2. We use this result to give zero-knowledge proofs for all of NP in the common reference string model. While our protocol is classical, it is sound against a cheating unbounded quantum prover and computational zero-knowledge even if the verifier is allowed a superposition attack. Finally, we consider multiparty computation and show that for the most general type of attack, simulation based security is not possible. However, putting a natural constraint on the adversary, we show a non-trivial example of a protocol that can indeed be simulated.
Now, if a quantum adversary is attacking honest players that use quantum computing or even quantum communication themselves, it does not seem justified to assume that he can only communicate classically with them. Indeed, as an example, consider a zero-knowledge protocol where the prover is implemented as a small quantum device sitting inside a mobile unit, say a PDA or a smart-phone. If an adversary gets hold of the unit, he may not be able to break in and directly read the prover's secret. But he can try to subject the device to unusual physical conditions, say by cooling it down and in this way perhaps be able to communicate quantumly with the prover, even if the device was not designed for this in the first place.
In this paper, we therefore introduce a new model of quantum attacks on classical cryptographic protocols, where the adversary is allowed to ask several classical queries in quantum superposition. In more concrete terms, we ask, for multiparty protocols: what happens if the adversary can be in superposition of having corrupted several different subsets? or, for zero-knowledge protocols: what happens if a quantum verifier can be in superposition of having issued several different challenges to the prover? As we argued above, we believe such superposition attacks to be a valid physical concern, but they also form a very natural generalization from a theory point of view: in the literature on black-box quantum computing, quantum black-box access to a function is usually defined by extending classical black-box access such that queries are allowed to contain several inputs in superposition. Our superposition attacks extend classical attacks in the same way.
Superposition attacks are strictly stronger than the standard one, and we consider the security of several primitives in this model: We show that a secret-sharing scheme that is perfectly secure with threshold t in the standard model is perfectly secure against superposition attacks if and only if the adversary's superposition is constrained to contain subsets of size at most t/2. If this condition is not satisfied, not only does perfect security fail, we show examples where the adversary may even learn the secret with certainty.
We use the secret-sharing result to construct zero-knowledge proofs for all of NP in the common reference string (CRS) model. While our protocol is classical, it is sound against a cheating unbounded quantum prover and computational zero-knowledge even if the verifier is allowed a superposition attack. Since we use the CRS model, the reader may ask why we do not use existing protocols for non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK), where the prover just sends a single message to the verifier. In this way, the adversary would not get a chance to do a superposition attack. However, the most general assumption under which NIZK is known to be possible is existence of one-way permutations. They in turn are only known to be realizable under assumptions that are easily broken by a quantum adversary, such as factoring or discrete log. Therefore we do not consider NIZK a satisfactory solution.
Finally, we consider multiparty computation and we define a UC-style model for static and passive superposition attacks on classical MPC protocols. Given our result on secret-sharing schemes, it is natural to speculate that classical MPC protocols that are secure against t corruptions, are secure against superposition attacks corrupting t/2 players. The situation turns out to be more complicated, however: We show that for the model that gives the adversary the most power (and hence is the most hostile to the simulator), simulation based security is not possible at all. The adversary can put its query in a state that prevents the simulator from learning any information on the inputs and outputs of corrupted players. However, putting a natural constraint on the adversary, we show a non-trivial example of a protocol that can indeed be simulated. By non-trivial, we mean that although the protocol is secure against a classical attack, we can show that it cannot be proved secure against a superposition attack by simply running the classical simulator in super-position. We therefore come up with techniques that are "more quantum" to do the simulation. We give a (in completely classical terms) a characterization of the protocols that can be simulated using these techniques. The obtained simulators are not necessarily efficient, however.
Whether more general positive results hold in this constrained model remains an open question. Likewise, the very natural question of security of quantum protocols against superposition attacks remains open. Note that in existing work on quantum multiparty computation [BCG + 05], the adversary's choice of subset to corrupt is classical. The negative part of our result on secret sharing described above shows that the protocol from [BCG + 05] is not secure against superpositions attacks as it stands.
Preliminaries

Notation and terminology
We will model players in protocols in two different ways: when we are not interested in computational limitations on parties, a player will be specified by a series of unitary transforms where the i'th transform is done on all qubits available to the party, after the i'th message has been received (in the form of a quantum register), and then some designated part of the storage is sent as the next outgoing message. We are limiting ourselves to perfect unitary transformation of the party's register because we are exactly considering the situation where an attacker manages to prevent coupling between the party and the environment.
In cases where we want to bound the computational complexity of a player, we consider a players to be an infinite family of interactive quantum circuits, as in the model from [FS09] , and then the complexity is circuit size.
Running functions in superposition
Consider any function, f : X → Y and a register of qubits, |ψ = 
Secret sharing
In (classical) secret sharing n parties are sharing some secret value s ∈ S using randomness r ∈ R, where S and R is the set of possible secrets and randomness. We name the parties P 1 , . . . , P n . Let [n] = {1, . . . , n}. Each party, P i , receives a share v i (s, r) ∈ {0, 1} k , also called his private view . That is, v i : S × R → {0, 1} k . For A ⊂ [n], let v A (s, r) = {v i (s, r)} i∈A be the string containing the concatenation of views for parties P i with i ∈ A. For convenience in the following we assume that each such string is padded, so that they have the same length regardless of the size of A. That is, v A : S × R → {0, 1} t . An adversary structure G is a family of subsets G ⊂ 2 [ n]. A secret sharing scheme is perfectly secure against classical G-attacks if for any A ∈ G, the distribution of v A (s, r) does not depend on s. The adversary structure of the secret sharing scheme is the maximal adversary structure F such that the scheme is perfectly secure against F attacks.
We'll model any passive attack on the scheme as an one-time query to an corruption oracle. The corruption oracle for a specific run of a secret sharing scheme O(s, r, A) = v A (s, r) is the function that on input A returns the private view of those parties. That is, O : S ⊗ R ⊗ F → {0, 1} t .
Two-party bit sharing example
Before we give the full model for secret sharing we start with a small example. We consider the case of 2 parties sharing a single bit, b ∈ {0, 1} using a random bit r ∈ {0, 1}.
[n] = {1, 2},
This scheme is trivially secure in the classical setting. In the follow we'll consider what happens if we allow the adversary to interact with the corruption oracle in superposition. As this is meant to introduce the concept, we'll cut a few corners in terms of technicality and and reserve that for the later sections. Assuming some specific bit has been shared with some specific randomness, we can write the state of the parties as |v 1 (b, r) ∈ H 2 and |v 2 (b, r) ∈ H 2 . Consider an adversary supplying the following input to the corruption oracle,
The oracle will run on both of these input in superposition. The state the adversary receives will be a mixed state over different choices of randomness and secrets. We'll assume both of these are uniformly chosen and he'll hence receive,
(|1 |b ⊕ r + |2 |r ). Define the state the adversary sees for a specific secret, b, as ρ adv
We would consider our bit sharing scheme secure iff for all possible queries, ρ adv 0 = ρ adv 1 . However, note that,
|b ⊕ r b|. It should be clear that
|1 ⊕ r 1| and hence ρ adv 0 = ρ adv 1 , which means the scheme is not secure if we allow the adversary to run the corruption oracle in superposition. This is not surprising since we know that using the Deutch-Josza algorithm you can actually distinguish between two such shares perfectly. Note that to do it perfectly it would require the use of a superposition of values for the response registers.
Model for secret sharing
We'll now give the full technical description of the model for superposition attacks on general secret sharing. To do this we first consider the state spaces needed to run the protocol and the attack on the protocol. First is the space that contains the shares for all the parties, H parties . The state in the register for this space is unchanged throughout the attack and is,
where |s, r is the purification of the secret and randomness choice. This is purely for technical reasons and does not matter for the adversary as he never sees it (and hence they might as well be considered measured). Next is the space for the environment, H env , which the adversary can use to choose his query and use as potential auxiliary register. The initial state for the environment is a general (pure) state,
Finally is the space holding the adversary's query to the corruption oracle, H query . This is initially a 'blank' state,
The space for the entire model is hence, H total = H parties ⊗ H env ⊗ H query and the intial state is,
The attack will be defined by two operations and an adversary structure F . First the adversary needs to construct his query for the oracle. This includes choosing the superposition of subsets he'll corrupt and associated values for the response registers. This is an arbitrary unitary operation. We'll denote it, U For an adversary structure F , we define F 2 = {A| A = B ∪ C where B, C ∈ F }. Theorem 1. Let G be the classical adversary structure for S. S is perfectly secure against superposition F -attacks if and only if F 2 ⊆ G.
Proof. For the forward direction, consider the adversary's final state,
Now, for any fixed A, A ′ , a, a ′ and s, consider the matrix
The crucial observation now is that this matrix is in 1-1 correspondence with the joint distribution of v A (s, r) and v A ′ (s, r). Namely, its entries are indexed by pairs of strings (α, β), where α, β are strings of the same length. And furthermore the (α, β)'th entry is the probability that the events v A (s, r) = α + a and v A ′ (s, r) = β + a ′ occur simultaneously. Now, if F 2 ⊆ G, we have that S is perfectly secure against classical F 2 -attacks. Therefore the joint distribution of v A (s, r) and v A ′ (s, r) does not depend on s, consequently each matrix
as required. For the only-if part, assume for contradiction that F 2 ⊆ G, i.e., there exist A 0 , A 1 such that A 0 ∪ A 1 ∈ G. It follows that a secret shared using S is uniquely determined from shares in A 0 ∪ A 1 . Then consider the query |ω α = (|A |0 + |A ′ |0 )/ √ 2. By the same computation as above, we see that ρ adv s contains a submatrix of form
, that corresponds to the joint distribution of shares in A and A ′ . But since the secret is uniquely determined from these shares, it follows that this submatrix is different for different secrets, and hence we get that there exists a measurement with non-zero bias towards the secret, and so S is not perfectly secure against quantum F -attacks. This is exactly the result we saw in the small example in Section 3.1.
Simplified models for secret sharing
When formalizing superposition attacks on secret sharing we need to consider if we allow the adversary to use different values for the response register. The choice provably make a difference for the strength of the model, and both options can be justified from a physical perspective. We therefore cover both models. When the adversary runs a classical component in superposition, then the reply will in general be a superposition. This opens the question of how the reply is delivered. In quantum information processing, it is customary that the result is xor'ed onto a response register a supplied along with the input. I.e., for a function f on is given a box which on classical input |x |a , the output is |x |a ⊕ f (x) . This is convenient, as it is invertible, so the action of the box on a superposition is given by its actions on the classical inputs. This approach is reasonable in quantum information processing, as one is typically designing the boxes one self. If f is a database one can simply design the quantum version to supply the output by xor'ing it onto a response register. Consider, however, the prover in a zero-knowledge proof, which is sent a challenge e and then sends back z(e). Even though the prover might be tricked into running on a superposition without noticing it, it does not seem reasonable that the prover would not notice it if we sent along a response register and asked her to xor her resply onto this register. In such a setting it seems more reasonable that the box/prover creates the response registers and returns them to the attacker/verifier. We model the setting of created response registers by restricting the more general setting of supplied response registers by allowing only a = 0. In that case the response from the box would be |x |f (x) .
Attacks on Secret Sharing
Even if a secret sharing scheme is not perfectly secure according the Theorem 1 it does not tell us anything about how much information the adversary can actually gain on the secret. One might even hope this could become negligible by increasing the amount of randomness used to create the shares. However, in this section we show that, for any two-party Shamir secret sharing scheme, an attack can distinguish between to possible secrets with considerable bias. The attack works even in the restricted setting of supplied response registers.
Lemma 1. Consider a two-party Shamir secret sharing scheme S. For any two secrets s, s ′ ∈ S : s = s ′ , there exists a query with a = 0 that will allow an adversary to distinguish between the two with probability at least p guess , where p guess ≥ 3 4 Proof. The adversary will need no auxiliary register, so let his state simply be the query register. He constructs the following (pure state) query
where |ω ∈ H query . The final state the adversary sees for different secrets is then,
where |ψ adv
It is well-known that the adversary's probability of distinguishing between two such states, ρ s adv and ρ s ′ adv , is
, where | . . . | T r denotes the trace norm. Define the difference between the two states as the matrix ∆.
Since the state for any party individually is independent of the secret we have that for all s,
which means we only need to consider A, A ′ ∈ {A 0 , A 1 }|A = A ′ .
Define the two submatrices:
It is well-known that if ∆ is of the form (2) and 1 2 S has singular values s 1 ≥ ... ≥ s p then ∆ has eigenvalues ±s 1 , ..., ±s p . Since ∆ is Hermitian, the trace norm is the sum of the absolute eigenvalues. From this we conclude that |∆| T r = |S| T r and we can reduce our problem to that of finding the trace norm of S. Let
Note that for the state to be normalized it must be that
|i i| is simply used to pad the subspace to ensure that the matrix is unitary. It will not be of any importance in the following calculations and can simply be ignored. It is well-known that
where U is any unitary matrix. In other words, any specific matrix U is going to give a lower bound on the trace norm. BothM s andM T s are such unitary matrices,
However the pair (v A 0 (s, r), v A 1 (s, r)), uniquely defines s and hence the sum is 0 unless s = s ′ . Therefore for s = s ′ : |S| T r ≥ 1.
which completes the proof. ⊓ ⊔
Zero-Knowledge
In this section, we present a zero-knowledge proof for any NP problem in the common reference string model. The proof is sound for an unbounded prover (quantum or not) and is computationally zero-knowledge for a polynomially bounded quantum verifier, even if superposition attacks are allowed.
For the protocol, we need a commitment scheme with special properties: we require a keyed commitment scheme Commit pk , where the corresponding public key pk is generated by one of two possible key-generation algorithms: G H or G B . For a key pkH generated by G H , the commitment scheme Commit pkH is unconditionally hiding, whereas the other generator, G B , actually produces a key pair (pkB, sk), so that the secret key sk allows to efficiently extract m from Commit pkB (m, r), and as such Commit pkB is unconditionally binding. Furthermore, we require that keys pkH and pkB produced by the two generators are computationally indistinguishable, for any family of polynomial size quantum circuits. We call such a commitment scheme a dual-mode commitment scheme. 1 As a candidate for implementing such a system, we propose the public-key encryption scheme of Regev [Reg05] , which is based on a worst-case lattice assumption and is not known to be breakable even by (efficient) quantum algorithms. Regev does not explicitly state that the scheme has the property we need, but this is implicit in his proof that the underlying computational assumption implies semantic security. 2
The Model
We now describe the framework for our protocol: the proof system is specified w.r.t. a language L, and we have a prover P and a verifier V , both are assumed classical (when playing honestly). They get as input a common reference string CRS chosen with a prescribed distribution σ and a string x. P and V interact and at the end V outputs accept or reject. The first two properties we require are standard: Completeness: if x ∈ L and P, V follow the protocol, V outputs accept with probability 1. Soundness: if x ∈ L (but CRS is chosen according to σ) then for any prover P * , V outputs accept with probability negligible (in the length of x) when interacting with P * on input x and CRS.
For zero-knowledge, we extend the capabilities of a cheating verifier V * so it may do a superposition attack For simplicity, we give our definition of superposition zero-knowledge only for 3-move public coin protocols, i.e., conversations are assumed to have the form (a, e, z), where e is a random challenge issued by the verifier. It is not hard to extend the definition but the notation becomes more cumbersome. First, V * is assumed to be a quantum machine, and the protocol is executed as follows: V * receives x, CRS and P 's first message a. Now, in stead of sending a classical challenge e, V * is allowed to send a query e,y α e,y |e |y .
We assume the the prover will process the query following his normal algorithm in superposition, so the verifier will get the same two registers back, in state e,y α e,y |e |y + z(x, e, ρ) , 1 The notions of dual-mode cryptosystems and of meaningful/meaningless encryptions, as introduced in [PVW08] and [KN08] , are similar in spirit but differ slightly technically. 2 The proof compares the case where the public key is generated normally to a case where it is chosen with no relation to any secret key. It is then argued that the assumption implies that the two cases are computationally indistinguishable, and that in the second case, a ciphertext carries essentially no information about the message.
This argument implies what we need.
where z(x, e, ρ) is P 's response to challenge e on input x and internal randomness ρ. Finally, V * outputs 0 or 1. Let p real (x) be the probability that 1 is output. We say that the proof system is superposition zero-knowledge if there exists an polynomial time quantum machine, the simulator S, such that the following holds for any cheating verifier V * and x ∈ L: S interacts with V * on input x, and we let p sim (x) be the probability that V * outputs 1. Then |p real (x) − p sim (x)| is negligible (in the length of x).
Note that, as usual in the CRS model, S only gets x as input and may therefore generate the reference string itself.
The Protocol
We now describe the basic ideas behind our protocol: we will let the CRS contain the following: pkB, c = Commit pkB (0), pkB ′ , where the public keys are both generated by G B . Then, using a standard trick, we will let P show that either x ∈ L or c contains a 1. Since of course the latter statement is false, P still needs to convince us that x ∈ L. The simulator, on the other hand, can construct a reference string where c does contain 1 and simulate by following the protocol. The CRS will look the same to the verifier so we just need that the change of witness used is not visible in the proof, i.e., the proof should be witness indistinguishable. In this way, we can simulate without rewinding, and this allows V * to be quantum.
However, standard techniques for witness indistinguishability are not sufficient to handle a superposition attack. For this, we need to be more specific about the protocol: a first attempt (which does not give us soundness) is that P will secret-share his witness w (where for the honest prover, w will be a witness for x ∈ L), to create shares s 1 , ..., s n where we assume the scheme has t-privacy. Then P 's first message is a set of commitments a = (Commit pkB ′ (s 1 , r 1 ) , ..., Commit pkB ′ (s n , r n )). The verifier's challenge e will point out a random subset of the commitments, of size t/2, and the prover opens the commitments requested. Intuitively, this is zero-knowledge by Theorem 1: since we limit the number of shares the verifier can ask for to half the threshold of the secret sharing scheme, the state V * gets back contains no information on the secret w.
On the other hand, this protocol is of course not sound, the verifier cannot check that the prover commits to meaningful shares of anything. To solve this, we make use of the "MPC in the head" technique from [IKOS09] : Here, we make use of an n-party protocol in which the witness w is secret-shared among the player, and a multiparty computation is done to check whether w is correct with respect to claim on the the public input, namely in our case x ∈ L and the c from the CRS contains 1. Finally all players output accept or reject accordingly. It is assumed that the protocol is secure against active corruption of t players where t is Θ(n). We will call this protocol π L,CRS in the following. Several examples of suitable protocols can be found in [IKOS09] . In their construction, the prover emulates an execution of π in his head, and we let v π L,CRS (i, ρ) denote he view of virtual player i, where ρ is the randomness used. The prover then commits to v π L,CRS (i, ρ), for i = 1...n and the verifier ask the prover to open t randomly chosen views that are checked for consistency and adherence to π L,CRS . It is shown in [IKOS09] that if no valid witness exists for the public input, then the verifier will detect an error with overwhelming probability. Now, observe that the process of emulating π can be thought of as a secret sharing scheme, where the prover's witness w is shared and each v π (i, ρ) is a share: indeed any t shares contain no information on w by t-privacy of the protocol. Therefore combining this with our rudimentary idea from before gives us the solution.
Superposition-secure zero-knowledge proof for any N P -language L.
The public input is x, of length k bits. The distribution σ generates the common reference string as pkB, c = Commit pkB (0), pkB ′ , where the public keys are both generated by G B on input 1 k .
1. The prover P emulates π L,CRS to generate v π L,CRS (i, ρ) and sends Commit pkB ′ (v π L,CRS (i, ρ), r i ), for i = 1...n, to the verifier V . 2. V sends a challenge e designating a random subset of the commitments of size t/2. 3. P opens the commitments designated by e, V checks the opened views according to the algorithm described in [IKOS09] , and accepts or rejects according to the result.
Theorem 2. If (G B , G H , Commit) form a secure dual-mode commitment scheme, then the above protocol is complete, sound and superposition zero-knowledge.
Proof. Completeness is trivial by inspection of the protocol. Soundness follows immediately from the soundness proof in [IKOS09] , we just have to observe that the fact that the prover opens t/2 and not t views makes no difference, in fact the proof holds as long as Θ(n) views are opened.
For zero-knowledge, we describe a simulator S: It will generate a common reference string as pkH, c = Commit pkH (1), pkH ′ where both public keys are generated by G H on inout 1 k . It then plays the protocol with V * , answering its quantum queries by following the protocol. This is possible since c now contains a 1, so S knows a valid witness. To show that V * cannot distinguish simulation from protocol, we define series of games
Game 0 The protocol as described above, but where P talks to V * doing a superposition attack. Game 1 As Game 0, but the CRS is generated as pkH, c = Commit pkH (0), pkB ′ where pkH is generated by G H and pkB ′ is generated by G B . Game 2 As Game 1, but the CRS is generated as pkH, c = Commit pkH (1), pkH ′ where both public keys are generated by G H . Game 3 As Game 3, but the P uses as witness the fact that c contains a 1. Now, Game 0 and Game 1 are computationally indistinguishable by assumption on the dual-mode commitment scheme, and the same is true for Game 1 and Game 2. Game 2 and Game 3 are statistically indistinguishable by Theorem 1 and the fact that commitments done using pkH ′ are statistically hiding. Finally, note that Game 3 is exactly the same game as the simulation.
Multiparty computation
In this section we consider the models for MPC protocols. A classical passive attack on a multiparty computation protocol looks a lot like the attacks on secret sharing: you query for a subset and get back the party's entire view of the protocol. Of course, you can generalize this to a quantum attack in the same way. And you can ask if there is some adversary structure for which the protocol would be secure against such an attack, assuming classical security.
Security for MPC protocols is usually defined as an adversary's ability to distinguish between an attack in the real world where he's allowed access to a corruption oracle of some subset of the parties and an ideal world where the attack is simulated towards the adversary using the ideal functionality of the protocol. We hence need to describe both models for the real and for the ideal world. They'll need different spaces and different operations to execute. As before, we have n parties running the protocol. We name the parties P 1 , . . . , P n . Let [n] = {1, . . . , n}. An adversary structure is F ⊂ 2 [ n]. Each party, P i , has local input, s i ∈ S i with is supplied by the adversary and chooses randomness, r i ∈ R i . s ∈ S and r ∈ R denotes the concatenation of each of these. v i (s, r) and o i (s, r) is the private view and output for the party P i , when the protocol has been run on inputs s and using randomness r. Note these are functions and not general quantum operations as the parties, even the corrupted ones, are expected to run the protocol honestly. For A ⊂ [n], let v A (s, r) = {v i (s, r)} i∈A , s A = {s i } i∈A o A (s, r) = {o i (s, r)} i∈A and be strings containing the concatenation of views, input and output for parties P i with i ∈ A. For convenience in the following we assume that each such string is padded, so that they have the same length (t bits) regardless of the size of A.
MPC model in the 'Real world'
First we will consider the case of running and attacking the protocol in the real world. As earlier, all actions taken by the parties and the adversary will be considered purified so the overall state remains pure throughout. Consider the following space,
H parties contains the private views and purification of the randomness for the parties. H in contains the input the parties will use to run the protocol. H out is where the output will be stored after running the protocol. H env is the environment and is used to store auxiliary input and any auxiliary register needed by the adversary. The dimension is therefore arbitrary, though finite. H query is where the query to, and response from, the oracle will be stored. Each of these subspaces are, of course, of appropriate (and finite) dimension.
We will break the superposition run, and attack, of a MPC protocol in the real world down into four unitaries. After each unitary we will consider the change to the description of the state. In the beginning all the registers are blank (ie. have value 0), except the environment, which might contain some (purified) auxiliary input for the adversary. The initial state is hence,
where |init rw t ∈ H total , |0 p ∈ H parties , |0 i ∈ H in , |0 o ∈ H out , |0 e ∈ H env and |0 q ∈ H query , as should be expected from the notation. The superscript, rw, specifies that it's in the real world. The first unitary is applied by the adversary and supplies the inputs to the parties. This is an arbitrary unitary operation. We'll denote it, U adv in , U
The result of this is that the input registers are now filled. These are in superposition over all possible inputs. The state after the first unitary is therefore,
The protocol is now run honestly without intervention from the adversary. This is a classical function run in superposition of the possible inputs and produces a corresponding superposition of private views and outputs for the parties. We'll denote this unitary, U pro run ,
Recall that we are purifying all actions, hence also the choice of randomness when the protocol is run. The state after the second unitary is therefore,
Next the adversary needs to construct his query to the oracle. This includes choosing the superposition of subsets he'll corrupt and associated values for the response registers for input, output and view. For simplicity we'll sometimes refer to these three values by a. That is, a = (a i , a o , a v ) . This is an arbitrary unitary operation. We'll denote it, U 
The adversary receives the response register and must now guess if he's in the real or ideal world. He can do this using the input register, his auxiliary register and the query register. To see the adversary's final state we need to trace out the register holding the view of all the parties,
where |ψ adv r,s =
x,A,a
It is interesting to note that even though the input register was supplied by the adversary, as the parties run the protocol their private state becomes entangled with the input register. This is a register the adversary does not have access to and as a consequence he now sees a mixed state over possible inputs.
We'll sum up these steps below in Figure 1 . Secondly we consider the ideal world, where a simulator is to simulate a real attack for the adversary using only the ideal functionality. The space for this model is,
H in , H out and H env serve the same purpose as in the real world.
H sim denotes the subspace in which the simulator operates. H query is still the register where the adversary constructs his query, but the simulator will be allowed to change this before using it to query the ideal functionality. Finally, we have a space for the ideal functionality, H idealF . This is necessary as we want to purify the random choices made and we need the state of the ideal functionality to be entangled with the input register as the parties would be in the real world. We'll describe the unitaries that differ and refer to the earlier description for those that don't. There will be six unitaries in total. The initial state is,
e ∈ H env and |0 q ∈ H query , as should be expected from the notation. The superscript, iw, denotes that it's in the ideal world. The first unitary is exactly as in the real world and hence,
The ideal functionality now entangles itself with the input register and produces the correct outputs in the output register. This is a classical function of each view in superposition. We'll denote this unitary,
Recall that any random choices are purified onto H idealF . The resulting state is therefore,
The adversary constructs his query exactly as earlier, Now the simulator gets the query and must construct an appropriate response to the adversary, only using the ideal functionality. First the simulator is allowed to change the adversary's query using an auxiliary register. Only requirement is that it is corruption preserving 3 . This is an arbitrary unitary operation. We'll denote it, U sim query , U Finally, to see what state the adversary sees we must trace out the ideal functionality, the output and the simulator registers,
where |ψ adv r,s,z =
x,A,a α x,z,s,A,a |s i |x e |A, ψ z,s,A,a q . Again, we will sum up the steps below in Figure   2 . A MPC protocol is defined by the operator U pro run (which in turn also defines U ideal out ). A specific adversay is defined by the initial state x α a |x and the two unitary operators, U adv in , U where we for readability assume that the operators are padded with appropriate identities on the subspaces they don't operate.
No simulator for general MPC if U sim
query is unitary Consider a simple MPC protocol with a single dealer that deals a secret s ∈ {0, 1} to a number of parties. Denote this dealer as the party, P 1 . The adversary will not need an auxiliary register in the following and will therefore be left out of the equations. Let the adversary make a query, defined by U adv,F query : H query → H query , that is only of the dealer and one more party where he puts the response register for the input in perfect superposition. The complete state after applying U adv,F query on the query register is,
where A = {1, 2} The state after applying the oracle is
If we look at the final part of the query register (v A (s, r)) we can see that it is in a classical state and contains the view of the dealer and one other party, that is, the randomness and one secret share. This uniquely defines the secret and hence the query register must be orthogonal for two different secrets.
In the ideal world assume, for the time being, that U sim query is the identity. The state after the oracle for the ideal functionality is applied is then,
Since this is in perfect superposition over all values of a i we can conclude that,
and the state the simulator sees is therefore independent of the secret. There's hence no way it can produce two orthogonal states depending on the secret and hence no way to simulate. For the case of a different simulator where U sim query is not the identity, but some unitary operation on H query , there exists a different adversary that applies the unitary,Ũ adv query = U adv,F query (U sim query ) −1 instead. The register the simulator sends to the oracle of the ideal functionality is now exactly the same as above, and the same argumentation can now be repeated. It follows that for any such simulator there exists an adversary that cannot be simulated.
No simulator for quantum attacks by running classical simulator in superposition
Unfortunately, it is not completely clear how to design a good quantum simulator, even assuming restrictions on F as in Theorem 1 for secret sharing and in the setting with created response registers. A natural first attempt would be to use a classical simulator (which we can assume exists) and produce a superposition of what it produces on those corrupted subsets that occur in the query. We can show, however, that this cannot work in general.
Let us first make clear what we mean by running a classical simulator in superposition: consider a classical machine S which gets as input parties subset A, the inputs and outputs of those parties (s A , o A (s)) and a random string c. It then outputs S(A, s A , o A (s), c). Running S in superposition now means that on input |ψ sim
This means that the state returned to the adversary will be
Now consider the following simple example protocol: we have 4 parties P 0 , P 1 , P 2 , P 3 . Player P 0 gets as input a bit s. He will then secret share it additively among the other parties: he chooses bits r 1 , r 2 at random and sends r 1 to P 1 , r 2 to P 2 and s ⊕ r 1 ⊕ r 2 to P 4 . There is no output defined for anyone. Clearly, this protocol is perfectly secure against a classical attack where at most 2 parties are corrupted. One might therefore hope that it would be perfectly secure against quantum attacks using superpositions of sets containing only 1 party.
However, we now argue that such security cannot be shown by running any classical simulator S in superposition. To this end, consider the case where we corrupt all parties in equally weighted superposition. This will mean that the simulator has to start from the input state.
The state has this form since the input and output for P 0 is just s and the other parties have no input or output. The state returned will be
If we define s {P i } = s i is some secret s if i = 0 and ⊥ otherwise, and index with P i , P i ′ instead of A, A ′ , we can write the state a bit more conveniently as:
On the other hand, we can compute the state ρ real,s that would be returned from a real attack. Define v i (s, r 1 , r 2 ) to be the view of the protocol for P i , defined as a 2-bit register. Thus v 0 (s, r 1 , r 2 ) = (r 1 , r 2 ), v 1 (s, r 1 , r 2 ) = (r 1 , 0), v 2 (s, r 1 , r 2 ) = (r 2 , 0), v 3 (s, r 1 , r 2 ) = (r 1 ⊕ r 2 ⊕ s, 0). This means that the state returned for a particular choice of s, r 1 , r 2 is |Ψ s,r 1 ,r 2 = 1 2
For fixed s, each choice of r 1 , r 2 occurs with probability 1/4, so
Consider the part of ρ sim,s that corresponds to P i = P 0 and P i ′ = P 1 . Then, since we assume perfect simulation, i.e., ρ sim,s = ρ real,s , for any c, we must have 0) , where the same r 1 occurs in both strings, since in a real execution, P 1 would of course receive the same bit that P 0 sent. We get an exactly similar conclusion for P i ′ = P 2 , and for P i ′ = P 3 , we can conclude that S(3, ⊥, c) = (s ⊕ r 1 ⊕ r 2 , 0). But now note that, we can simply compute S(i, ⊥, c) for i = 1, 2, 3 and some fixed c. Then the above shows that if running S in superposition was a perfect quantum simulator, we could compute (s, 0) = S(1, ⊥, c) ⊕ S(2, ⊥, c) ⊕ S(3, ⊥, c), without any information on s, which is of course a contradiction.
Limited simulators
The result in 5.3 strongly suggests that it's impossible to construct a simulator for general MPC protocols in the setting with supplied response registers. In this section we will discuss the problem of constructing a simulator for the model with created response registers and protocols for deterministic functions. That is, the output does not depend on the chosen randomness. While simulators in general consists of two operators, {U sim query , U sim res }, we will restrict U query sim to be the identity. That is, the query from the adversary is sent directly to the oracle. We can do this wlog because there's no values in the response register and U query sim must be corruption preserving. Assume all randomness is uniformly chosen. This can be done wlog and helps to unclutter the notation. For a specific protocol, define the matrix (or vector of states) M (A, s) as
We can now express the security of the protocol in the following way Lemma 2. A multiparty computation protocol for a deterministic function is perfectly secure against quantum F -attacks w, and only if, there exists a set of |R| × |R| unitary matrices {U s } s∈S such that for all s, s ′ ∈ S, r ∈ R, A ∈ F s,s ′ where
Proof. Consider the final state the adversary sees (using the output is independent of randomness and only 0 in the response registers), To continue we need a claim that is almost equivalent to Theorem 4 in [CJW04] , but changed slightly for our specific purposes. For this reason we'll also provide a separate proof. The reader is encouraged to read [CJW04] for additional information on the existence of transformations between sets of quantum states.
Claim. There exists a perfect simulator, i.e. ρ rw adv = ρ iw adv , iff there exist unitary operator, U sim res such that for all x, s ∈ S
(7) where [U s ] i,k is the i, k index of a unitary matrix in some set of unitary matrices, {U s } s∈S .
Proof. For the forward direction, consider the final state the adversary sees
where we used that [U s ] i,k is unitary and only depends on s. This means the adversary sees the state he expects (except for labels) and we've completed the proof for the forward direction. Conversely, assume for contradiction that there is a simulator that can constructs the correct mixed state for the adversary, but none that can construct one of the form of equation (7). If
x,k,s p k |φ x,k,s φ x,k,s | is the state the simulator sents back, then it must be that ∀x, s :
This is true if, and only if, there exists unitary matrices, {U x,s } x,s , such that,
By purifying the state we see we get,
Note that we can choose the purification because all purifications are unitarily equivalent. And since the value of x only effects the amplitude we can, by linearity, assume that U x,s does not depend on x. This shows that the state produced by any perfect simulator must be of that form. This is a contradiction and completes the proof. ⊓ ⊔ U sim res exists (and is unitary) if it preserves inner product between all possible states, hence we can conclude that there exists a perfect simulator if there exists a set of unitary matrices, {U s } s∈S such that for all x, x ′ , s, s ′ ∈ S and all queries {α x,s,A }, {α
For the LHS we have that,
For the RHS we get that,
As the state in equation (7) must be normalized it follows that the maximum value of
|R| , so for the entire sum is only one if, and only if,
Hence we see that, there exists a simulator iff there exist |R| × |R| unitary matrices U s such that for all s,
Using the definition of M (A, s) we can now write the requirement in the more convenient way: There exists a simulator for the MPC protocol if, and only if, there exist a set of unitary matrices, {U s } s∈S , such that for all s, s ′ ∈ S, A ∈ F s,s ′ :
which completes the proof of Lemma 2. ⊓ ⊔
We'd like to warn the reader that it is important not to confuse the unitary matrices, {U s } s∈S , with the simulator itself. They are merely a tool to show the existence of one. Also, at this point the reader would be excused for lacking any intuition on why the lemma is reasonable. We therefore find it instructive to consider two examples. First we'll reconsider secret sharing in this framework and secondly a simple MPC protocol.
Secret sharing example
For this example we'll show that all secret sharing schemes secure against superposition F-attacks in fact satisfies the requirement in Lemma 2 (as they should). This does not add to what we already knew and is only meant to illustrate the principles. We'll allow each choice of randomness to be non-uniform as it adds only very little clutter. We note that since no parties have any input or output we have that for all s, s ′ ∈ S : F s,s ′ = F . The result follows as a Corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. If a secret sharing scheme S is perfectly secure against quantum F -attacks then there exists a set of |R| × |R| unitary matrices {U s } s∈S such that for all s, s ′ ∈ S, r ∈ R, A ∈ F i∈R
Proof. Since the secret sharing scheme is secure we know from Theorem 1 that the joint distribution of the view for any A, A ′ ∈ F is independent of s and hence, for all s, s ′ ∈ S; This is equivalent to saying that the fidelity of two such states is 1. According to Uhlmann's Theorem this implies that there exists purifications of σ s and σ s ′ such that their inner product is 1. Unitary equivalence of purifications implies you can write any such purification in H ⊗ R, where dim(R) = |R|, as
where {U s } s∈S is a set of |R| × |R| unitary matrices. As the fidelity must be 1, it must be that for all s, s ′ ∈ S   i,k∈R
Because A∈F |α A | 2 = 1 and noting the states are normalized, we can conclude that ∀s, s ′ ∈ S, k ∈ R, A ∈ F :
From which the result follows. ⊓ ⊔
Simple MPC simulator example
For this example we return to the simple four-party (P 0 , P 1 , P 2 , P 3 ) bit-sharing scheme considered in section 5.4. There we showed that we could not simulate an attack by simply running a classical simulator for the protocol in superposition. We are now in position to show that a simulator nonetheless exists. Recall that |v 0 (s, r 0 , r 1 ) = |r 0 , r 1 , |v 1 (s, r 0 , r 1 ) = |r 0 , 0 , |v 2 (s, r 1 , r 2 ) = |r 1 , 0 , |v 3 (s, r 0 , r 1 ) = |r 0 ⊕ r 1 ⊕ s, 0 . We have two possible inputs s ∈ {0, 1} so we need to find two unitary matrices, U 0 , U 1 in order to apply Lemma 2. These have been found manually.
Of particular interest is A = P 3 as the view depends on the secret (for fixed randomness). Choose r = (0, 0): 
General MPC
In this section we'll give a restatement of Lemma 2, expressing the requirement for the existence of a simulator as an explicit property of the multiparty computation protocol. This will allow for a straight-forward, albeit extremely inefficient, method for checking the security of any deterministic MPC protocol in this model. For all ordered pairs of inputs, s, s ′ ∈ S, and all sets A ∈ F s,s ′ we'll associate a permutation of the randomness, {π s,s ′ ,A } s,s ′ ,A∈F s,s ′ ∈ S(R). By ordered pairs we mean that π s,s ′ ,A may differ from π s ′ ,s,A . Note that property (1) is exactly the statement that a (not necessarily efficient) simulator exists in the classical model.
Proof. Before we begin we'll need the following claim, Claim. We can without loss of generality assume that all the rows (and columns) of U s sum to 1.
Proof. First recall that according to Lemma 2 we have that there is a simulator iff ∃U 0 , · · · , U |S|−1 st.
∀s, s ′ ∈ S, ∀A ∈ F s,s ′ : M (A, s)U s = M (A, s ′ )U s ′
